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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The appellant believes there is only one issue presented to the Court on appeal.
That issue is whether or not the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman had been perfected as
against the Appellee.
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The issue presented is a question of law. The Court is not obligated to give
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, but reviews them for correctness. In the
matter of the adoption of W. Baby Boy. 904 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCE,
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATIONS
ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL
The applicable constitutional provision is the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution which provides in part: "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or propeity, without due process of
law.5

Utah Constitution Ait. I, Section 7: "No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."
Utah Code Ann. Sections 78-30-4.2(2)(e); 78-30-4.14(2); 78-30-4.15; 78-30-7, all
of which sections are attached to the Appendix herein.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter was based upon the Appellee's attempt to set aside the adoption of
Sidney Laken Fluhman by the child's maternal grandmother, Paige Parsons. The matter
was tried on April 27, 1999, by the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, Judge Second District
Court, Davis County, State of Utah. An adoption proceeding had occurred, which was
filed on January 12, 1998, in Second District Court in Case No. 982700016, when the
minor child, Sidney, was over the age of six months old, Sidney having been bom on
March 26, 1997. The trial court had determined that the Appellee, Timothy J. Sanchez,
was entitled to notice, and thus the adoption as related to him was not perfected, and that
the placement of the child, if it had ever occurred, occurred sometime on or
approximately January 12, 1998, when the action was filed in the Second District Court.
The effect of the court's mling was to allow the Appellee to thereafter file any additional
pleadings that he wished to in order to seek paternity and visitation, or for the Appellants
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to take further action on the adoption after complying with the notice requirement, as
each party so chose.
(NOTE TO THE COURT: The Appellee has subsequently filed a petition for
paternity in Case No. 994700813, which is in the Second District Court, Davis County,
State of Utah. The Appellee has subsequently been granted visitation rights to Sidney
Laken Fluhman, and he has been declared as the natural father of said child in that case.
A petition to terminate parental rights, was made by the Appellant, Paige Parsons, in the
Second Judicial Juvenile Court, in Case No. 980110, has been dismissed by the Juvenile
Court.)
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Paige Parsons, an appellant, is the mother of Laura Fluhman, also an appellant,
and the maternal grandmother of Sidney Laken Fluhman. Laura Fluhman has always
resided with Parsons, and continues to do so. (Tr. p. 82, lines 1-10)
The appellants have always at all time relevant herein resided in Davis County.
During 1996, Appellee, Timothy Sanchez ("Sanchez") and appellant, Laura
Fluhman ("Fluhman") entered into a relationship. During the course of this relationship,
Fluhman conceived a child.
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On March 26, 1997 a child, Sidney Laken Fluhman ("Sidney"), was born at
University Hospital. It is uncontested that Sanchez is the natural father of Sidney. (Tr. p.
82, lines 16-20)
However, Sanchez's name was not listed on the birth certificate as the father of Sidney.
The birth certificate lists the father as "unknown" which is an untrue statement. (Tr. P.
97, lines 8-13)
In September, 1996, prior to Sidney's birth, Sanchez opened a savings account at
America First Credit Union in the name of Laura Fluhman and regularly deposited money
each week into this account, which money was withdrawn by Laura Fluhman for her use
during her pregnancy. (Tr. p. 13, lines 23-25; p. 14, lines 1-25; p. 83, lines 12-16; p.
106, lines 5-10; p 83, lines 12-18.)
There were numerous occasions, prior to the birth, that Sanchez and Fluhman
discussed raising Sidney together as parents, even though they knew that they would not
be together as a couple. (Tr. p. 15, lines 6-23, p. 16, lines 11-15)
Fluhman and Sanchez discussed insurance needs prior to the birth of the child.
Sanchez offered to add Sidney to his insurance policy that he earned through his
employment. Fluhman declined to accept the coverage for Sidney, claiming that Sidney's
was covered through Parsons' insurance, and that Fluhman wanted Sidney to be covered
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under Parsons' insurance. Fluhman repeatedly told Sanchez that she did not want
Sanchez to provide insurance and would not allow Sidney to have his surname, since she
wanted Sidney to be covered under Parson's insurance. (Tr. p. 12, lines 10-25, p. 13,
lines 1-2)
Sanchez also provided a changing table, baby clothes, diapers, and assorted other
baby items, which were turned over to Fluhman for the care and use of Sidney. (Tr. p. 20,
lines 16-25., p. 21, lines 1-25, p. 22, lines 1-25, p. 23, lines 1-13.)
Approximately three months prior to Sidney's birth, Fluhman informed Sanchez
that his name would not be placed on the birth certificate and his child would be given
the name of Fluhman, rather than Sanchez. (Tr. p. 11, lines 24-25; p. 12, lines 1-9.)
Fluhman assured him that this was only for insurance puiposes. (Tr. p. 97, lines 2-6.)
Sanchez asked to be present for Sidney's birth and asked Fluhman to call him
when she was going to the hospital. It was his belief that she was going to do so. (Tr. p.
13, lines 10-22.)
Fluhman did not keep her word that she would call him when she went to the
hospital. Sanchez was informed of the birth by someone else. Sidney was bom on
March 26, 1997, three weeks premature. As a consequence of her premature birth,
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Sidney remained in the hospital after Fluhman was released. Fluliman did not contact
Sanchez until five days following the birth of Sidney. (Tr. p. 86, lines 1-22.).
After being informed of the birth by a third-party, Sanchez went to the hospital to
visit his child. He approached a group of nurses in the neonatal unit and asked to see his
baby. They asked for the name of the child. When he responded that her name was
Sidney "Fluhman", the nurses conferred with each other out of earshot of Sanchez and
then informed him that there was no child by that name there. While still at the hospital,
Sanchez contacted Fluhman and asked her what was going on. She responded by
becoming upset that he was at the hospital and told him that he could not see the baby by
himself. He was not allowed to see Sidney on this visit to the hospital. (Tr. 17, lines 2125; p. 18, lines 1-24.)
No documents were given to Sanchez by the hospital staff. He was not shown a
birth certificate or informed about filing any document of paternity. (Tr. 19, lines 2-17 .)
Sanchez called Fluhman again and made a date with her to go to the hospital to see
Sidney. Fluhman subsequently met him at the hospital on April 9, 1997, and went with
him to see Sidney. Sanchez found out later than Sidney was, in fact, at the hospital, but
was there under an assumed name of "Hyde". (Tr. p. 84)
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Again, no birth certificate

was shown to Sanchez, nor was he informed about paternity documents. (Tr. p. 24, lines
5-16.)
When Sidney left the hospital, she and Fluhman resided at the home of Fluhman's
mother, Paige Parsons ("Parsons"). Because of a remodeling of Parsons' home to make
room for Fluhman and Sidney together, for the first few months of Sidney's life, Sidney
slept in Parson's room in a small playpen. After the remodeling, Sidney was moved to
Fluhman's room, where she continues to sleep at night. (Tr. p. 88, lines 9-24.)
At this time, Sanchez was divorced from his wife and was paying child support for
his two children from his marriage.
After the birth of Sidney, each month Sanchez gave Fluhman a check for the
support of Sidney, just as he gave his ex-wife money for the support of their two children.
His payments to Fluhman began in April, 1997. He determined the amount of this
payment for the support of Sidney by looking at a child support worksheet for the
payment of support of his two children from his marriage where he found the amount for
three children, and paid one third of that amount to Fluhman each month. (Tr. p. 25,
lines 19-25; p. 26, lines 1-25, p.27, lines 1-11.)
Sanchez again expressed his desire to parent Sidney and to have "all the rights that
the law says that a father deserves." (Tr. p. 15, lines 17-20). Fluhman repeatedly assured
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Sanchez that he was welcome to visit Sidney whenever Fluhman and Parsons were at
home and it was convenient to do so. Sanchez began to visit Sidney approximately twice
a month, usually on weekends when he had visitation with his other children. He often
brought his two girls along to visit with Sidney and began to ask when he would be able
to take the baby from Parsons home and visit with her and his other children as a family
unit. Fluhman and Parsons told him that Sidney was too young to leave their home with
him, but assured him that a time would come when he would be able to take Sidney for
visits. Fluhman and Parsons set dates when Sidney would be old enough to go with
Sanchez, but when those dates came, Fluhman and Parsons would continue the time to
sometime in the future. (Tr. p. 31, lines 14-25; p. 32, lines 1-25; p. 33, lines 1-23.
Sanchez continued to give Fluhman checks for the support of Sidney, and Fluhman
continued to accept these checks. She and Sanchez continued to discuss the parenting of
Sidney and Fluhman assured him that she would always make Sidney available to him
and would welcome his participating in the parenting of Sidney. Sanchez continued to
look forward to the time when he would be able to visit with Sidney and his other
children at a place of his choosing.
On September 26, 1997, Fluhman brought Sidney to the home of a friend of
Sanchez where Sanchez was residing and visited with him there. (Tr. p. 34, lines 15-23.)
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Sanchez continued to visit with Sidney at least twice monthly, often bringing his
other two children along with him so that he could bond with Sidney and the three
children could be a family unit. He continued to plan for the time when he could
participate with Sidney as she grew, and Fluhman continued to assure him that she would
never keep Sidney from him.
In December 1997 Sanchez received a raise in salary and immediately increased
his child support for Sidney from $165 to $175 monthly. Fluhman continued to accept
the checks given to her by Sanchez. (Tr. p. 46, line25; p. 47, lines 1-19.)
On December 23, 1997, Fluhman, Parsons, and two of Fluhman's sister brought
Sidney to the home where Sanchez was living. There, along with Fluhman's family and
friends they participated in a Christmas party for Sidney. They ate dinner together and
watched Sidney open the Christmas gifts provided for Sidney by Sanchez. (Tr. p. 36,
lines 16-22.)
Sanchez continued to visit Sidney at the home of Fluhman and Parsons through the
rest of 1997 and January of 1998. Sanchez was making plans with Fluhman to take
Sidney to his home for his birthday. Fluhman told him that "it might be a possibility.
We'll see what happens when it comes around." (Tr. p. 40, lines 2-7)
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On February 14, 1998, Fluhman called Sanchez and told him that Parsons had
adopted Sidney. At this time, Fluhman told Sanchez that she did not intend to keep
Sidney away from him. Fluhman also assured Sanchez at this same time that the
adoption was only for medical insurance purposes. Fluhman also told Sanchez that they
wouldn't take his money anymore, because Parsons had adopted Sidney. When Sanchez
stated that he would send the money to Parsons, Parsons told him that they would just
send the money back. (Tr. p. 40, lines 7-25; p. 41, lines 1-25; p. 48, lines 1-6.)
On March 29, 1998, Sanchez hosted a birthday party for Sidney at the home of his
friend, where Sanchez was residing. His family and friends attended this party, with
some of Fluhman's family. Sidney was brought to the home of Sanchez by Fluhman and
Parsons. (Tr. p. 48, lines 11-25; p. 49, lines 1-7.)
Sanchez continued to visit Sidney at least two times a month at the home of
Fluhman and Parsons during the months of April, May and June of 1998. (Tr. p.49, lines
8-24.)
On July 8, 1998 while Sanchez was again visiting Sidney at the home of Fluhman
and Parsons, Fluhman told Sanchez that it would be "best that I went on my own way and
she went her way." She them told Sanchez that she was not going to allow him to see
Sidney anymore. (Tr. p. 50, lines 1-4.) However, later during this same visit, she told
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Sanchez that she would call him in a few weeks and he could bring his other children to
visit with Sidney. However, she did not make that call.
After this date, Sanchez was not allowed visitation with his child, Sidney.
In September, 1998, Sanchez caused a complaint to be filed against Parsons and
Fluhman in the Second District Court, Davis County. The complaint alleged four causes
of action. The first cause of action alleged that Sidney was a minor and as such a
Guardian Ad Litem should be appointed to protect Sidney's best interests.
Sanchez's second cause of action alleged that Parsons adoption of Sidney was
fraudulent, demanded that the adoption be set aside, that Sanchez be deemed Sidney's
natural father, that he be given parental rights, and that Sidney be given his surname.
Sanchez's third cause of action alleged that Parson's adoption of Sidney was
fraudulent, and should be set aside.
Sanchez's fourth cause of action alleged inducement, i.e. that Laura made
fraudulent statements to Sanchez upon which he relied. The fourth cause of action
demanded general, special, punitive, and exemplary damages against Fluhman and
Parsons in an amount not less than $500,000.
A bench trial was held on Sanchez's Complaint on April 27, 2000 in the Utah
Second District Court, Davis County, Judge Thomas L. Kay presiding. Fluhman and
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Parsons were present and represented by counsel, Keith Eddington. Sanchez was present
and represented by Randy S. Ludlow.
On April 27, 1999, the trial court found that Sidney was placed for adoption after
she was at least six months old. Sanchez was not notified of the adoption, and therefore
his parental rights were violated by Fluhman and Parsons. The Court found that
placement of Sidney occurred after the petition of Fluhman and Parsons was filed in
Second District Court, Davis County on approximately January 12, 1998. The Court
found and awarded judgment to Sanchez on the basis that Parsons' adoption of Sidney
was not perfected as to Sanchez, as no notice of the adoption was given to Sanchez.
On July 14, 1999, during a hearing on Defendant's Objections to the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court ruled Ihat the applicable statute was U.C.A. § 7830-4.14 (2)(a) or 2(b), and that section (4) was not applicable. The court ruled that
"placement presumes notice and living with respondent was ambiguous as to notice."
(July 14, 2000 hearing, p. 9, lines 24-25.) The court went on to say regarding Sanchez's
relationship with Sidney, that". . . regarding his relationship with the child, a measure of
responsibility, visited at least monthly, that under those circumstances under U.C.A. § 7830-4.14 his consent was necessary to the adoption and that he should have been given
notice to the matter." (July 24, 1000 hearing p. 10, lines 2-7.)
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Since the birth of Sidney, Fluhman has always been the child's caretaker. (Tr. p.
93). Fluhman gets Sidney up in the mornings, feeds the child, plays with the child, reads
to the child, bathes the child and acts as the child's mother while Parsons leaves and goes
to work between 6:00 a.m. and 7:30 a.m., returning to the home between 6:00 p.m. and
7:00 p.m. and sometimes as late as 10:00 p.m. (Tr. p. 89, 90, 92, and 93). Parsons is
gone twelve to thirteen hours per day (Tr. p. 91). It is clear that Fluhman is the parent
and not Parsons. Fluhman claimed that the purpose of the adoption was because of her
health problems (she has diabetes) and insurance. (Tr. p. 94). Fluhman doesn't work
(Tr. p. 87). She spends her days with Sidney.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellee, Timothy J. Sanchez, was entitled to notice before the Appellants
proceeded with the adoption proceedings. Because no notice had been given to him, the
adoption as it relates to his rights had not been determined, and the adoption had not been
perfected. Appellee thereafter had the right to file appropriate proceedings to establish
his paternity to the child or the Appellants to proceed with their adoption.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DETERMINED
THAT SIDNEY LAKEN FLUHMAN'S ADOPTION AS IT RELATES
TO THE APPELLEE HAD NOT BEEN PERFECTED, WHICH
SET ASIDE THE ADOPTION IN REGARDS TO THE RIGHTS
OF THE APPELLEE
The Appellee did not give his consent to the adoption and he was not personally
served with notice of the adoption proceeding as required by Utah law. The consent of
an unmarried biological father is required before an adoption can proceed provided the
father meets certain criteria listed in Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.14. The
requirements vary depending on the age of the child at the time the child is "placed with
adoptive parents". U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(a)&(b) (1953, as amended).
In cases where the child is over six months old before being placed with adoptive
parents the consent of an unmarried biological father is required if the father:
[has] developed a substantial relationship with the child, taken some
measure of responsibility for the child and the child's future, and
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by
financial support of the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in
accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented from doing so by
the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. U.C.A.
§ 78-30-4.14(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended).
In addition to the above requirements, an unmamed biological father must also do one of
the following:
-14-

(A) visitf] the child at least monthly when physically and financially able to
do so, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized
agency having lawful custody of the child; or
(B) [have] regular communication with the child or with the person or
agency having the care of custody of the child, and when not prevented
from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of
the child. Id.
If the father of such a child meets these requirements, then Utah Code Annotated, Section
78-30-4.13 mandates that before the child can be adopted, the father must consent and
receive personal service of the adoption proceeding. U.C.A. §§ 78-30-4.13(2)(a) & 7830-4.13(11) (1953 as amended.)
The trial court looked to determine when the child had been "placed" for adoption.
In reviewing this, the court looked at two factors. The first of these was the statute as set
forth at U.C.A. § 70-30-7(1) which provides that "the adoption procedure commences by
filing a petition with the clerk of the district court in the district where the person
adopting resides, or with the juvenile court . . ." Section (2) provides "a petition for
adoption shall be filed within thirty days of the date the adoptee is placed in the home of
the Appellee for purposes of adoption . . . ." (Emphasis added) The requirements in
U.C.A. § 78-30-7(1) are jurisdictional. Appellants claim that this is a venue issue which
is contrary to the statute. The trial court had determined that because the child and
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Parsons lived in Davis County, jurisdiction occurred where the petition for adoption was
filed in that county.
The court thereafter looked at the facts in this case to determine whether a
placement had ever occurred, as it would be typically defined by the term. The
grandmother and child both resided in Davis County, and thus no "placement for
adoption" had occurred until the proceedings commenced in Davis County on
approximately January 12, 1998. (See Conclusions No. 2 and 4). In reviewing the facts,
it was apparent that the child had never been "placed for adoption" because the child still
continues to be raised and taken care of by the child's natural mother, who has never, in
fact, relinquished control or care of the child. (Findings 24 and Conclusion No. 6).
Based upon these factors, the trial court had thereafter determined that the child was at
least six months old when it was placed for adoption that thereby not requiring the
Appellee to meet the more stiingent requirements of U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b). Even if
it was determined that Sidney was "placed" for adoption in the home of Paige Parsons,
that placement could only have occurred sometime approximately January 12, 1998,
when the Second District Court acquired jurisdiction of the action. The 30 day rule,
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-30-7(2) would still have placed the age of the child at least six
months or greater at the time of the "placement." Because the natural mother has not
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relinquished physical custody of the child, Sidney has and was never actually "placed"
with adoptive parents, because Fluhman has never stopped acting as her mother.
In a very similar case, the Utah Court of Appeals confronted ambiguity created by
similar language of an older version of Utah's adoption act. In re K.B.E. and TM. E.,
740 P.2d 292 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion, did not
think that the unmarried father was statutorily required to register an acknowledgment of
paternity because, like Fluhman, the mother never actually surrendered her parental rights
or released physical custody or control of her child. Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). In
situations where the mother does not relinquish physical custody or control of her child,
the state's declared strong interests diminish greatly in importance.
For example, if a mother does not cease to act as the child's parent, the state no
longer needs to "promptly determine those persons who will assume the parental role."
Id. If the mother continues to provide the child with physical care, the state need not
assure "immediate and continued physical care." Id. Also, if a mother remains with her
child, the state no longer has a strong interest in "facilitating uninterrupted bonding of a
child to its parents." Id.
Like the mother in K.B.E., Fluhman has not relinquished physical custody or
control over her child. Because Fluhman has continued to live with Sidney and has
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continued to provide primary care, "speedy termination of the natural father's interests is
not necessary" in this case. Since the state has no interest in terminating Appellee's
parental rights, it cannot justify requiring him to timely file a formal acknowledgment of
paternity, especially where the Appellee has already established a substantial relationship
with Sidney.
Based on the statute and the facts, the trial court had determined that the child's
placement, if it occurred at all, only occurred when the child was at least six (6) months
old with that time being approximately January 12, 1998 (Conclusion #6). The trial
court, in determining when the child was "placed" for adoption, having occurred after the
child was six months old, thereafter turned its attention and focus on whether or not the
Appellee had complied with U.C.A. § 70-30-4.14(2)(a)(i), (A) or (B) to determine
whether or not notice would have been required as to him, or his consent given, so that
the adoption would be perfected, which would thereafter have terminated his rights to the
child. The testimony as provided at trial established, prior to the child's birth, that
Appellee took personal and financial responsibility for the appellant Fluhman during her
pregnancy; he attempted to formally acknowledge his paternity by placing his name on
the child's birth certificate, but was prevented from doing so by Fluhman; he voluntarily
paid $165 to $175 per month in child support after the birth of the child; he purchased
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various items for the child including clothing, books, changing table, diapers, toys, and
other items on behalf of the child; he visited the child since her birth and did so twice a
month on average, when allowed to do the same, even after the adoption had occurred
until approximately August, 1998; he requested greater visitation but was not allowed
more; he had at all times medical insurance available through his employment, and
offered that insurance to the natural mother, who refused the insurance; he established a
relationship with the minor child; he sought to parent the child; all of which facts
establish that the Appellee had developed a substantial relationship with the child and
taken a measure of responsibility to provide for the child, providing support to the natural
mother during her pregnancy, and support thereafter and has demonstrated a full
commitment to the child and was willing to do more and wished to do more, but was
prohibited from doing the same by the Appellants. Because Appellee had established a
substantial relationship, it was required on the part of the Appellants that they give him
notice and/or obtain his consent before proceeding with the adoption proceedings.
U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(2)(a)(i)(A) or (B). Their failure to do the same, therefore, meant the
adoption was not perfected as it related to the Appellee, and allowed him the right to
proceed to file any and all actions necessary to establish his paternity and rights to
Sidney.
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Appellee had met his requirements and obligations as required pursuant to § 7830-4.14(2)(a)(i)(A) or (B). He had acquired the constitutional protection of an unmarried
biological father pursuant to his timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth. U.C.A. § 78-304.12(2)(e).
Thus, even if this court determined that Sidney was less than six months old when
she was placed with adoptive parents and the more stringent requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-30-4.14(2)(b) apply, the Appellee is nonetheless entitled to have
the adoption decree set aside on state and federal constitutional grounds. The Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "no state shall
make or enforce any law which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The same rights exist in the
Utah Constitution Art I, Section 7. The Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized that "[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by coming 'forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause." Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (quoting Caban v.
Mohammed. 441 U.S. 380, 441 (1979)). The Appellee's relationship with Sidney is also
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protected under the Due Process Clause of both the United States and Utah's
Constitutions. In re J.P.. 648 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982).
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-30-4.13 through 78-30-4.15 are
unconstitutional as applied in this case because they fail to adequately balance the rights
and interests of all the parties affected. Furthermore, the procedures provided in the
statutes do not adequately protect the liberty interest of the Appellee or the best interest
of the child. The legislature has declared that the state has a compelling interest "in
providing stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner, in
preventing the disruption of adoptive placements, and in holding parents accountable for
the needs of children." U.C.A. § 78-30-4.12 (1953 as amended). However, the
legislature has also mandated "that in every adoption the best interest of the child should
govern and be of foremost concern in the court's interest." U.C.A. § 78-30-1.5 (1953 as
amended)
In this case, the state's interest is not nearly as compelling as it would be if the
child were being placed with an agency or with new adoptive parents. Here, the child has
been adopted by his grandmother and the birth mother has not relinquished custody of the
child.
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Setting aside the adoption decree will not infringe on the Appellants interests
because the adoption is a sham created to cut off Appellee's and Sidney's relationship.
The Appellants have stated that their reason for having Parsons adopt the child was to
provide the child with medical insurance coverage. However, the Appellee has medical
insurance which covers Sidney and he informed Fluhman of this fact. The only reason
that Appellants had Parsons adopt Sidney was to cut off the Appellee's parental rights.
Sidney, the most important party involved here, is in no way benefitted from the
feigned adoption by Parsons. Her birth mother is still the primary caretaker. Her
grandmother has not changed her relationship with Sidney in any way. Indeed, Sidney is
actually harmed by the adoption because she has lost her father and all of the things that
only her natural father could provide.
Sidney would benefit a great deal in having a father which would be in her best
interests which best interest should count. U.C.A. § 78-30-1.5. Both Appellee and
Sidney would be able to continue to develop their relationship and bond as parent and
child. Sidney will benefit from future support, nurturing and guidance provided by her
natural father. Sidney will benefit from the stability that her father will provide.
Appellee has acted as a father to Sidney and has developed a substantial relationship with
Sidney. He has never denied his paternity nor shirked his parental responsibilities.
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Appellee has regularly visited with Sidney and has voluntarily provided child support for
Sidney. The Appellee would very much like to continue to develop his relationship with
Sidney. It would be a gross miscamage of justice and due process to arbitrarily sever the
substantial relationship that has already been initiated by Appellee merely because the
Appellee did not formally acknowledge his paternity by the time the adoption had been
filed and/or entered.
In a similar case In re K.B.E. & T.M.E., supra, an unmarried biological father
contested the adoption of his child to the natural mother and her grandfather pursuant to
an older version of the statutes at issue here. In the name of due process and fundamental
fairness, the Utah Court of Appeals validated the father's acknowledgment of paternity
although he had not met the statutory requirements. Id. After weighing the competing
interests of the parties involved, the court determined that the child would be benefitted,
nor harmed, from the opportunity to develop a relationship with the natural father. Id.
The court stated: "respondent will provide financial support for T.M.E. and that
respondent will be able to develop a parental relationship with T.M.E." Id. The court
concluded that it would contravene fundamental fairness "to deprive both respondent and
T.M.E. of the possible benefits of their relationship." Id. Likewise, fundamental
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fairness, due process and the best interest of the child require that Appellee be allowed to
develop and maintain his relationship with Sidney.
Based on the trial court's findings and conclusions, it was not necessary for the
trial court to determine fraud nor the constitutionality of the adoption statutes. If this
court concludes that the more restrictive requirement contained in U.C.A. § 78-304.14(2)(b) applies, then this court should find that the statutory law as it would apply to
the appellee is unconstitutional based on the facts and circumstances as exist in this case.
The Appellants have addressed in their brief an issue complaining that they were
not "on notice" of the Appellee's position pursuant to his complaint and the proceedings
occurring herein. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Appellee made a motion
for summary judgment or the issues of placement and the adoption statute was addressed
pursuant to that motion and the response as made therein. (R. 20-21, 36-65, 66-68) These
issues were made and identified both in writing at the time of the hearing on the Motion
to Dismiss on February 2, 1999. (R. p. 75-76) The court even referenced the same at
trial on April 27, 1999 (Tr. p. 4) Further, the trial court, at trial, allowed all testimony
dealing with the facts at issue in the case, and at the conclusion of the trial, had requested
of Appellee the relief he so sought, which relief was to have the adoption set aside and
allow the Appellee to continue his relationship with the child and act as the father for the
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child to establish his paternity to the child. (Tr. p. 223) Pursuant to Rule 54(c)(1) and
(15)(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint could be amended at trial.
The court can and did make findings based on the evidence. The trial court has that
discretion. See Westlev v. Farmer's Ins Exch.. 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). Morris v.
Russell 120 Utah 545, 236 P.2d 451 (Utah 1951); Draper v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc..
121 Utah 567, 244 P.2d 360 (Utah 1952); England v. Horbach. 944 P.2d 340 (Utah
1997). The prayer for relief as always requested pursuant to the Appellee's complaint
was to "set aside the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman and to have plaintiff declared to
be the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman, with him awarded all rights, titles, and
obligations as would be appropriate for a natural father, including the requirements of
paying support, visitation, and the like . . . ." (R. at p7)
The trial court had asked, as to the theory of the Appellee's case, and it had been
informed that it hinges on whether the child was six months old when it was "placed" for
adoption and if that was the case, that it would be determined pursuant to the adoption
statute under either 2(a) or 2(b). (Tr. at p. 4.) There was no coaching from the court, as
supposedly claimed by Appellants. The lack of notice claim is without a basis and
improperly made to this court.

-25-

The Appellants further claim that pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-30-4.16(3), that the
decree is final and thus may not be contested by the Appellee. This is incorrect and not
in conformity with § 78-30-4.16(1) which provides " . . . if a party who was entitled to
notice and consent under the provisions of this chapter, was denied that right, and did not
otherwise waive or forfeit that right under the terms of this chapter, the court may:
(a) enjoin the adoption or dismiss the adoption petition, and
proceed in accordance with subsection (2) or;
(b) determined whether proper grounds for termination of the
parent's rights exist and, if so, order that the parent's rights be terminated in
accordance with provisions of this chapter . . . ."
Because the trial court determined that the Appellee is entitled to notice, the
adoption decree is not final within the meaning and term of the statute. It can only be
final after an adjudication of his rights and duties and/or after receiving his consent, none
of which has been accomplished or done. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.16(3) therefore is not
applicable to this case.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The ruling by the trial court was based upon the statutes and the facts as existed,
and as they continue to exist. The Appellee had met his obligation as required pursuant
to statute to require that he be given notice of any adoption proceedings involving the
child based upon his relationship to the child. No such notice was ever given by
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Appellants. The sham adoption by Parsons was the vehicle that has been attempted to be
used to cut off Appellee's rights to his child. The trial court determined that notice
needed to be given before the adoption proceedings could be completed as against the
rights of Appellee to the child. This gave each party its rights to either proceed with a
paternity action by the Appellee or proceed, after the giving of notice, with the adoption
by the Appellants. This court should sustain the findings, conclusions, and order, and
award to the Appellee his costs and any additional relief which the court deems
appropriate.

.
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APPENDIX

78-30-1

JUDICIAL CODE

of this chapter by releasing or making public that confidential
information, or by otherwise breaching the confidentiality
requirements of this chapter, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, unless the information is otherwise released or provided pursuant to the provisions of Title 26, Chapter 6a. 1999
PART IV

Section
78-30-15.
78-30-15.1.
78-30-15.5.
78-30-16.
78-30-17.

PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS

78-30-18.
CHAPTER 30
ADOPTION
Section
78-30-1.

Who may adopt — Adoption of minor — Adoption of adult.
78-30-1.1.
Licensed child placing agency — Defined.
78-30-1.5.
Legislative intent — Best interest of child.
78-30-1.6.
Children in the custody of the Division of Child
and Family Services — Consideration of
child's relationship with foster parents who
petition for adoption.
78-30-2.
Relative ages.
78-30-3.
Adoption by married persons.
78-30-3.5.
Preplacement and postplacement adoptive
evaluations — Exceptions.
78-30-4, 78-30-4.1. Repealed.
78-30-4.2 to 78-30-4.5. Renumbered as §§ 78-30-4.18 to 78-304.21.
78-30-4.6 to 78-30-4.8. Repealed.
78-30-4.9.
Renumbered.
78-30-4.10.
Repealed.
78-30-4.11.
Definition.
78-30-4.12.
Rights and responsibilities of parties in adoption proceedings.
78-30-4.13.
Notice of adoption proceedings.
78-30-4.14.
Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for adoption.
78-30-4.15.
Responsibility of each party for their own actions — Fraud or misrepresentation —
Statutory compliance.
78-30-4.16.
Contested adoptions — Rights of parties —
Determination of custody.
78-30-4.17.
Parents whose rights have been terminated.
78-30-4.18.
Persons who may take consents and relinquishments.
78-30-4.19.
Time period prior to birth mother's consent.
78-30-4.20.
When consent or relinquishment effective.
78-30-4.21.
Power of a minor to consent or relinquish.
78-30-4.22.
Custody pending final decree.
78-30-4.23.
Criminal sexual offenses.
78-30-4.24.
Determination of rights prior to adoption petition.
78-30-5.
Repealed.
78-30-6.
Consent of child — When necessary.
78-30-7.
Jurisdiction of district and juvenile court —
Time for filing.
78-30-8.
Agreement by adoptive parent or parents.
78-30-8.5.
Alien child — Evidence of lawful admission to
United States required.
78-30-9.
Decree of adoption — Best interest of child —
Legislative findings.
78-30-10.
Name and status of adopted child.
78-30-11.
Birth parents' rights and duties dissolved.
78-30-12, 78-30-13. Repealed.
78-30-14.
Division of Child and Family Services — Duties — Report — Fee.
78-30-14.5.
Fees.

78-30-19.

624
Petition, report, and documents to be sealed —
Exceptions.
Compliance with the Interstate Compact on
Placement of Children.
Itemization of fees and expenses.
Definitions —Applications.
Nonidentifying health history of adoptee filed
with bureau — Limited availability.
Mutual-consent, voluntary adoption registry
— Procedures — Fees.
Restrictions on disclosure of information —
Violations — Penalty.

78-30-1. Who may adopt — Adoption of minor — Adoption of adult.
(1) Any minor child may be adopted by an adult person, in
accordance with the provisions and requirements of this
section and this chapter.
(2) Any adult may be adopted by another adult. However,
all provisions of this chapter apply to the adoption of an adult
just as though the person being adopted were a minor, except
that consent of the parents of an adult person being adopted is
not required.
(3) (a) A child may be adopted by:
(i) adults who are legally married to each other in
accordance with the laws of this state, including
adoption by a stepparent; or
(ii) any single adult, except as provided in Subsection (3)(b).
(b) A child may not be adopted by a person who is
cohabiting in a relationship t h a t is not a legally valid and
binding marriage under the laws of this star, ~ » purposes of this Subsection (3)(b), "cohabiting" mear. , a i d ing with another person and being involved in a sexual
relationship with t h a t person.
2000

78-30-1.1. Licensed child placing agency — Defined.
As used in this chapter the term "licensed child placing
agency" means an agency licensed to place children for adoption under Title 62A, Chapter 4a, P a r t 6.
1995

78-30-1.5. Legislative intent — Best interest of child.
(1) It is the intent and desire of the Legislature that in
every adoption the best interest of the child should govern and
be of foremost concern in the court's determination.
(2) The court shall make a specific finding regarding the
best interest of the child, in accordance with Section 78-30-9
and the provisions of this chapter.
2000

78-30-1.6. Children in the custody of the Division of
Child and Family Services — Consideration
of child's relationship with foster parents
who petition for adoption.
In assessing the best interest of a child in the custody of the
Division of Child and Family Services whose foster parents
have petitioned for adoption, the court shall give special
consideration to the relationship of the child with his foster
parents, if the child h a s been in t h a t home for a period of six
months or longer.
1997

78-30-2. Relative ages.
A person adopting a child must be at least ten years older
than the child adopted, unless the petitioners for adoption are
a married couple, one of which is at least ten years older than
the child.

1985

78-30-3. Adoption by married persons.
A married man who is not lawfully separated from his wife
may not adopt a child without the consent of his wife, neither
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may a married woman who is not separated from her husband
adopt a child without his consent, if the spouse not consenting
is capable of giving t h a t consent.
1990
78-30-3.5.

78-30-4.12
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Preplacement and postplacement adoptive
evaluations — Exceptions.

(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a child
may not be placed in an adoptive home until a
preplacement adoptive evaluation, assessing the prospective adoptive parent and the prospective adoptive home,
has been conducted in accordance with the requirements
of this section.
(b) The court may, at any time, authorize temporary
placement of a child in a potential adoptive home pending
completion of a preplacement adoptive evaluation described in this section.
(c) Subsection (l)(a) does not apply if a birth parent has
legal custody of the child to be adopted and the prospective adoptive parent is related to that child as a stepparent, sibling by half or whole blood or by adoption,
grandparent, aunt, uncle, or first cousin, unless the evaluation is otherwise requested by the court. The prospective
adoptive parent described in this Subsection (c) shall,
however, obtain the information described in Subsections
(2)(a) and (b), and file that documentation with the court
prior to finalization of the adoption.
(d) The requirements of Subsection (l)(a) are satisfied
by a previous preplacement adoptive evaluation conducted within three years prior to placement of the child,
or an annual updated adoptive evaluation conducted after
that three-year period or within one year after finalization of a previous adoption.
(2) The preplacement adoptive evaluation shall include:
(a) criminal history record information regarding each
prospective adoptive parent and any other adult living in
the prospective home, received from the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services Division of the Department of Public Safety, in accordance with Section 53-10108, no earlier than 18 months immediately preceding
placement of the child;
(b) a report from the Department of Human Services
containing all information regarding reports and investigation of child abuse, neglect, and dependency, with
respect to each prospective adoptive parent and any other
adult living in the prospective home, obtained no earlier
than 18 months immediately preceding placement of the
child, pursuant to waivers executed by those parties; and
(c) an evaluation conducted by an expert in family
relations approved by the court or a certified social
worker, clinical social worker, marriage and family therapist, psychologist, professional counselor, or other courtdetermined expert in family relations, who is licensed to
practice under the laws of this state. The evaluation shall
be in a form approved by the Department of Human
Services. Neither the Department of Human Services nor
any of its divisions may proscribe who qualifies as an
expert in family relations or who may conduct evaluations
pursuant to this Subsection (2).
(3) A copy of the preplacement adoptive evaluation shall be
filed with the court.
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (b) and (c), a
postplacement evaluation shall be conducted and submitted to the court prior to the final hearing in an adoption
proceeding. The postplacement evaluation shall include:
(i) verification of the allegations of fact contained
in the petition for adoption;
(ii) an evaluation of the progress of the child's
placement in the adoptive home; and
(iii) a recommendation regarding whether the
adoption is in the best interest of the child.

(b) The exemptions from and requirements for evaluations, described in Subsections (l)(c), (2)(c), and (3), also
apply to postplacement adoptive evaluations.
(c) Upon the request of the petitioner, the court may
waive the postplacement adoptive evaluation, unless it
determines that it is in the best interest of the child to
require the postplacement evaluation.
(5) If the person or agency conducting the evaluation disapproves the adoptive placement, either in the preplacement
or postplacement adoptive evaluation, the court may dismiss
the petition. However, upon request of a prospective adoptive
parent, the court shall order that an additional preplacement
or postplacement adoptive evaluation be conducted, and hold
a hearing on the suitability of the adoption, including testimony of interested parties.
(6) Prior to finalization of a petition for adoption the court
shall review and consider the information and recommendations contained in the preplacement and postplacement adoptive studies required by this section.
1999
78-30-4, 78-30-4.1.

Repealed.

78-30-4.2 t o 78-30-4.5.
78-30-4.21.
78-30-4.6 to 78-30-4.8.
78-30-4.9.
78-30-4.10.

R e n u m b e r e d as §§ 78-30-4.18 to
1995
Repealed.

R e n u m b e r e d as § 78-30-4.22.
Repealed.

1990,1995

1995
1995
1995

78-30-4.11. Definition.
For purposes of this chapter, "unmarried biological father"
means a child's biological father who is not married to the
child's mother at the time of the conception or birth of that
child.
1995

78-30-4.12. Rights and responsibilities of parties in
adoption proceedings.
(1) The Legislature finds that the rights and interests of ail
parties affected by an adoption proceeding must be considered
and balanced in determining what constitutional protections
and processes are necessary and appropriate.
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) the state has a compelling interest in providing
stable and permanent homes for adoptive children in a
prompt manner, in preventing the disruption of adoptive
placements, and in holding parents accountable for meeting the needs of children;
(b) an unmarried mother, faced with the responsibility
of making crucial decisions about the future of a newborn
child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make
timely and appropriate decisions regarding her future
and the future of the child, and is entitled to assurance
regarding the permanence of an adoptive placement;
(c) adoptive children have a right to permanence and
stability in adoptive placements;
(d) adoptive parents have a constitutionally protected
liberty and privacy interest in retaining custody of an
adopted child; and
(e) an unmarried biological father has an inchoate
interest that acquires constitutional protection only when
he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy and
upon the child's birth. The state has a compelling interest
in requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate
that commitment by providing appropriate medical care
and financial support and by establishing legal paternity,
in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.
(3) (a) In enacting Sections 78-30-4.11 through 78-30-4.21,
the Legislature prescribes the conditions for determining
whether an unmarried biological father's action is suffi-
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ciently prompt and substantial to require constitutional
protection
(b) If an unmarried biological father fails to grasp the
opportunities to establish a relationship with his child
that are available to him, his biological parental interest
may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by
his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps
to substantiate it
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary m order to
facilitate the state's compelling interest The Legislature
finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the child,
and the adoptive parents described in this section outweigh the interest of an unmarried biological father who
does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and
demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance
with the requirements of this chapter
(d) An unmarried biological father has the primary
responsibility to protect his rights
(e) An unmarried biological father is presumed to t now
t h a t the child may be adopted without his consent unless
he strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter,
manifests a prompt and full commitment to his parental
responsibilities, and establishes paternity
(4) The Legislature finds t h a t an unmarried mother has a
right of privacy with regard to her pregnancy and adoption
plan, and therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the
identity of an unmarried biological father prior to or during an
adoption proceeding, and has no obligation to volunteer information to the court with respect to the father
1995

78-30-4.13. Notice of adoption proceedings.
(1) An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that
he has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is
deemed to be on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption
proceeding regarding that child may occur, and has a duty to
protect his own rights and interests He is therefore entitled to
actual notice of a birth or an adoption proceeding with regard
to that child only as provided in this section
(2) Notice of an adoption proceeding shall be served on each
of the following persons
(a) any person or agency whose consent or relinquishment is required under Section 78 30-4 14 unless that
right has been terminated by waiver, relinquishment,
consent, or judicial action,
(b) any person who has initiated a paternity proceeding
and filed notice of that action with the state registrar of
vital statistics within the Department of Health, in accordance with Subsection (3),
(c) any legally appointed custodian or guardian oi the
adoptee,
(d) the petitioner's spouse, if any, only if he has not
joined in the petition,
(e) the adoptee's spouse, if any,
(f) any person who is recorded on the birth certificate
as the child's father, with the knowledge and consent of
the mother,
(g) any person who is openly living in the same household with the child at the time the consent is executed or
relinquishment made, and who is holding himself out to
be the child's father, and
(h) any person who is married to the child's mother at
the time she executes her consent to the adoption or
relinquishes the child for adoption
(3) (a) In order to preserve any right to notice and consent,
an unmarried biological father may initiate proceedings
to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and file a notice of the initiation of
those proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics within the Department of Health prior to the mother's
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execution of consent or her relinquishment to an agency
That action and notice may also be filed prior to the child's
birth
(b) If the unmarried biological father does not know the
county in which the birth mother resides, he may initiate
his action in any county, subject to a change in trial
pursuant to Section 78-13-7
(c) The Department of Health shall provide forms for
the purpose of filing the notice described in Subsection
(3)(a), and make those forms available in the office of the
county health department m each county
(4) Notice provided in accordance with this section need not
disclose the name of the mother of the child who is the subject
of an adoption proceeding
(5) The notice required by this section may be served
immediately after relinquishment or execution of consent, but
shall be served at least 30 days prior to the final dispositional
hearing The notice shall specifically state that the person
served must respond to the petition within 30 days of service
if he intends to intervene in or contest the adoption
(6) (a) Any person who has been served with notice of an
adoption proceeding and who wishes to contest the adoption shall file a motion in the adoption proceeding within
30 days after service The motion shall set forth specific
relief sought and be accompanied by a memorandum
specifying the factual and legal grounds upon which the
motion is based
(b) Any person who fails to file a motion for relief
withm 30 days after service of notice waives any right to
further notice in connection with the adoption, forfeits all
rights in relation to the adoptee, and is barred from
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to assert
any interest m the adoptee
(7) Service of notice under this section shall be made as
follows
(a) With regard to a person whose consent is neces-* iry
under Section 78-30-4 14, service shall be m accordance
with the provisions of the Utah Eules of Civil Procedure
If service is by publication, the court shall designate the
content of the notice regarding the identity of the parties
The notice may not include the name of the person or
persons seeking to adopt the adoptee
(b) As to any other person for whom notice is required
under this section, service by certified mail, return receipt
requested, is sufficient If that service cannot be completed after two attempts, the court may issue an order
providing for service by publication, posting, or by any
other manner of service
(c) Notice to a person who has initiated a paternity
proceeding and filed notice of that action with the state
registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health in
accordance with the requirements of Subsection (3), shall
be served by certified mail, return receipt requested, at
the last address filed with the registrar
(8) The notice required by this section may be waived in
writing by the person entitled to receive notice
(9) Proof of service of notice on all persons for whom notice
is required by this section shall be filed with the court before
the final dispositional hearing on the adoption
(10) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither
the notice of an adoption proceeding nor any process in that
proceeding is required to contain the name of the person or
persons seeking to adopt the adoptee
(11) Except as to those persons whose consent to an adoption is required under Section 78-30-4 14, the sole purpose of
notice under this section is to enable the person served to
intervene in the adoption and present evidence to the court
relevant to the best interest of the child
2000
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78-30-4.14. Necessary consent to adoption or relinquishment for adoption.
(1) Either relinquishment for adoption to a licensed childplacing agency or consent to adoption is required from:
(a) the adoptee, if he is more than 12 years of age,
unless he does not have the mental capacity to consent;
(b) both parents or the surviving parent of an adoptee
who was conceived or born within a marriage, unless the
adoptee is 18 years of age or older;
(c) the mother of an adoptee born outside of marriage;
(d) any biological parent who has been adjudicated to
be the child's biological father by a court of competent
jurisdiction prior to the mother's execution of consent or
her relinquishment to an agency for adoption;
(e) any biological parent who has executed a voluntary
declaration of paternity in accordance with Title 78,
Chapter 45e, prior to the mother's execution of consent or
her relinquishment to an agency for adoption;
(f) an unmarried biological father of an adoptee, as
defined in Section 78-30-4.11, only if the requirements
and conditions of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been
proven; and
(g) the licensed child-placing agency to whom an
adoptee has been relinquished and that is placing the
child for adoption.
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an
unmarried biological father is necessary only if the father has
strictly complied with the requirements of this section.
(a) (i) With regard to a child who is placed with adoptive parents more than six months after birth, an
unmarried biological father shall have developed a
substantial relationship with the child, taken some
measure of responsibility for the child and the child's
future, and demonstrated a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by financial support of
the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented
from doing so by the person or authorized agency
having lawful custody of the child, and either:
(A) visiting the child at least monthly when
physically and financially able to do so, and when
not prevented from doing so by the person or
authorized agency having lawful custody of the
child; or
(B) regular communication with the child or
with the person or agency having the care or
custody of the child, when physically and financially unable to visit the child, and when not
prevented from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child.
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father, whether expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this subsection
shall not preclude a determination that the father
failed to meet the requirements of this subsection.
(iii) An unmarried biological father who openly
lived with the child for a period of six months within
the one-year period after the birth of the child and
immediately preceding placement of the child with
adoptive parents, and openly held himself out to be
the father of the child during that period, shall be
deemed to have developed a substantial relationship
with the child and to have otherwise met the requirements of this subsection.
(b) With regard to a child who is under six months of
age at the time he is placed with adoptive parents, an
unmarried biological father shall have manifested a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection prior to the
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time the mother executes her consent for adoption or
relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency.
The father shall:
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity,
and file with that court a sworn affidavit stating that
he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the
child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, and
agreeing to a court order of child support and the
payment of expenses incurred in connection with the
mother's pregnancy and the child's birth;
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity
proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics
within the Department of Health, in a confidential
registry established by the department for that purpose; and
(iii) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy,
paid a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses
incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy
and the child's birth, in accordance with his means,
and when not prevented from doing so by the person
or authorized agency having lawful custody of the
child.
(3) An unmarried biological father whose consent is required under Subsection (1) or (2) may nevertheless lose his
right to consent if the court determines, in accordance with the
requirements and procedures of Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4,
Termination of Parental Rights Act, that his rights should be •
terminated, based on the petition of any interested party.
(4) If there is no showing that an unmarried biological
father has consented to or waived his rights regarding a
proposed adoption, the petitioner shall file with the court a
certificate from the state registrar of vital statistics within the
Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has been
made of the registry of notices from unmarried biological
fathers described in Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and that no filing has
been found pertaining to the father of the child in question, or
if a filing is found, stating the name of the putative father and
the time and date of filing. That certificate shall be filed with
the court prior to entrance of a final decree of adoption.
(5) An unmarried biological father who does not fully and
strictly comply with each of the conditions provided in this
section, is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right
in relation to the child, including the right to notice of any
judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the
child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not
required.
1995
78-30-4.15. R e s p o n s i b i l i t y of e a c h party for t h e i r o w n
a c t i o n s — F r a u d or m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n —
Statutory compliance.

(1) Each parent of a child conceived or born outside of
marriage is responsible for his or her own actions and is not
excused from strict compliance with the provisions of this
chapter based upon any action, statement, or omission of the
other parent or third parties.
(2) Any person injured by fraudulent representations or
actions in connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue
civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law. A
fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance
with the requirements of this chapter, and is not a basis for
dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption
decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party.
Custody determinations shall be based on the best interest of
the child, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78-304.16.
(3) The Legislature finds no practical way to remove all risk
of fraud or misrepresentation in adoption proceedings, and
has provided a method for absolute protection of an unmarried
biological father's rights by compliance with the provisions of
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this chapter. In balancing the rights and interests of the state,
and of all parties affected by fraud, specifically the child, the
adoptive parents, and the unmarried biological father, the
Legislature has determined that the unmarried biological
father is in the best position to prevent or ameliorate the
effects of fraud and that, therefore, the burden of fraud shall
be borne by him.
(4) The Legislature finds that an unmarried biological
father who resides in another state may not, in every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly
comply with, the requirements of this chapter. Therefore when
all of the following requirements have been met, that unmarried biological father may contest an adoption, prior to finalization of the decree of adoption, and assert his interest in the
child; the court may then, in its discretion, proceed with an
evidentiary hearing under Subsection 78-30-4.16(2):
(a) the unmarried biological father resides and has
resided in another state where the unmarried mother was
also located or resided;
(b) the mother left that state without notifying or
informing the unmarried biological father that she could
be located in the state of Utah;
(c) the unmarried biological father has, through every
reasonable means, attempted to locate the mother but
does not know or have reason to know that the mother is
residing in the state of Utah; and
(d) the unmarried biological father h a s complied with
the most stringent and complete requirements of the state
where the mother previously resided or was located, in
order to protect and preserve his parental interest and
right in the child in cases of adoption.
1998

78-30-4.16. Contested adoptions — Rights of parties —
Determination of custody.
(1) Whenever any party contests an adoption, the court
shall first determine whether the provisions of this chapter
have been complied with. If a party who was entitled to notice
and consent under the provisions of this chapter, was denied
that right, and did not otherwise waive or forfeit that right
under the terms of this chapter, the court may:
(a) enjoin the adoption, or dismiss the adoption petition, and proceed in accordance with Subsection (2); or
(b) determine whether proper grounds for termination
of that parent's rights exist and, if so, order that the
parent's rights be terminated in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Part 4,
Termination of Parental Rights Act.
(2) (a) In any case, and under any circumstance, if a court
determines that a petition for adoption may not be
granted, the court may not automatically grant custody of
a child to a challenging biological parent, but shall conduct an evidentiary hearing in each case, in order to
determine who should have custody of the child, in
accordance with the child's best interest.
(b) Evidence considered at that hearing may include,
but is not limited to, evidence of psychological or emotional bonds that the child had formed with third parties
and any detriment that a change in custody may cause to
the child. The fact that a person relinquished a child to a
licensed child placing agency or executed a consent for
adoption may not be considered by the court as evidence of
neglect or abandonment.
(c) Any custody order entered pursuant to this section
may also include provisions for visitation by a biological
parent or interested third party, and provide for the
financial support of the child.
(3) An adoption may not be contested after the final decree
of adoption is entered.
1995
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78-30-4.17. Parents whose rights have been terminated.
Neither notice nor consent to adoption or relinquishment for
adoption is required from a parent whose rights with regard to
an adoptee have been terminated by a court.
1995
78-30-4.18.

P e r s o n s w h o m a y t a k e c o n s e n t s a n d relin-

quishments.
(1) A consent or relinquishment by a birth mother or an
adoptee shall be signed before:
(a) a judge of any court that has jurisdiction over
adoption proceedings, or a public officer appointed by that
judge for the purpose of taking consents or relinquishments; or
(b) a person who is authorized by a licensed childplacing agency to take consents or relinquishments so
long as the signature is notarized or witnessed by two
individuals who are not members of the birth mother's
immediate family.
(2) If the consent or relinquishment of a birth mother or
adoptee is taken out of state it shall be signed before:
(a) a person who is authorized by a child-placing
agency licensed by that state to take consents or relinquishments; or
(b) a person authorized or appointed to take consents
or relinquishments by a court of this state that has
jurisdiction over adoption proceedings, or a court of that
state that has jurisdiction over adoption proceedings.
(3) The consent or relinquishment of any other person or
agency as required by Section 78-30-4.14 may be signed before
a Notary Public or any person authorized to take a consent or
relinquishment under Subsection (1) or (2).
(4) A person, authorized by Subsection (1) or (2) to take
consents or relinquishments, shall certify to the best of his
information and belief that the person executing the consent
or relinquishment has read and understands the consent or
relinquishment and has signed it freely and voluntarily.
(5) A person executing a consent or relinquishment is
entitled to a copy of the consent or relinquishment.
2000
78-30-4.19. Time period prior to birth mother's consent.
A birth mother may not consent to the adoption of her child
or relinquish control or custody of her child until at least 24
hours after the birth of her child.
1995
78-30-4.20. When c o n s e n t or r e l i n q u i s h m e n t effective.
A consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed
and may not be revoked.
1995
78-30-4.21. P o w e r of a m i n o r to c o n s e n t or r e l i n q u i s h .
A minor parent h a s the power to consent to the adoption of
his or her child and has the power to relinquish his or her
control or custody of the child to a licensed child-placing
agency. That consent or relinquishment is valid and has the
same force and effect as a consent or relinquishment executed
by an adult parent. A minor parent, having executed a consent
or relinquishment, cannot revoke t h a t consent upon reaching
the age of majority or otherwise becoming emancipated. 1995

78-30-4.22. Custody pending final decree.
(1) Except as otherwise provided by the court, once a
petitioner has received the adoptee into his home and a
petition for adoption has been filed, the petitioner is entitled to
the custody and control of the adoptee and is responsible for
the care, maintenance, and support of the adoptee, including
any necessary medical or surgical treatment, pending further
order of the court.
(2) Once a child has been placed with, relinquished to, or
ordered into the custody of a licensed child-placing agency for
purposes of adoption, the agency shall have custody and

Randy S.Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (801) 322-1628

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIMOTHY SANCHEZ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 984701550CS

LAURA FLUHMAN, PAIGE PARSONS,
and SIDNEY LAKEN FLUHMAN,

Judge Thomas L. Kay

Respondent.
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on the 27th day of April, 1999. The
petitioner was present and represented by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondents,
Laura Fluhman and Patricia Paige Parsons were present and represented by their attorney of record,
Keith E. Eddington. The court having taken testimony together with receiving exhibits from the
parties, the court having previously hadfiledmemorandums and based upon such and for good cause
appearing herein the court makes these its

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. All parties in this matter are and were at all times residents of Davis County.
2. The petitioner and Laura Fluhman had a sexual relationship.
3. As a result of the sexual relationship between petitioner and Laura Fluhman the parties had
born to them a child, to wit: Sidney Laken Fluhman who was born on March 26, 1997.
4. The petitioner went to the hospital where the child was born in order to see the child and
to determine what was necessary in order to have him deemed as the father of the child.
5. Upon going to the hospital the petitioner was informed that the child was not there by the
hospital staff based on information given to the staff by Laura Fluhman.
6. The petitioner thereafter was able to see the child at the hospital.
7. After the child was born the petitioner began to visit with the child and he commenced
making child support payments.
8. Prior to the birth of the child the petitioner had given some monies to the respondent,
Laura Fluhman.
9. The petitioner continued to give to Laura Fluhman child support in the amount of
approximately $165.00 per month commencing April 1997 which he increased to $175.00 in
December 1997 and continued thereafter in until he went to make the February 1998 payment which
was thereafter refused to be accepted by the respondent, Laura Fluhman. It was at this time that she
informed the petitioner of the adoption of her child by Paige Parsons (aka Patricia Paige Parsons).
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10. Paige Parsons is the mother of Laura Fluhman and is the grandi notl ler of Sidi i&] I ak .en
Fluhman.
11 lietnii I'mi'iftiiiiin nil.; IlK' * liilil MJ|»| UH I pasnuMil, llir pclili. .iei had deposited monies into
the A merica First Credit Union account of Laura Fluhman prior to the child's birth. He also
purchased various items for the baby including clothing, book, changing table, diapers, toys and other
items : •
1..'

'
I he petitioner had continually visited with the child since its birth and did so twice a

month on average and was thereafter allowed to do the same after the adoption had occurred until
approximated Aiyust 1998.
1?

On Api ^1 ? I I °97 the respondent, Paige Parsons, filed a petition for adoption seeking

County,, in case no. 9729001 lHxv~>.
1 1 Patricia Paige Parsons, respondent herein, was a resident of Davis County as was the
child at the time

i: nr i ^^ - ^

15. No a</:;-."':':S ueu* taken by Patricia Paiue Parsons \o complete the adoption or to do a/113r

January 12, 1998 which would have been approximately ten (10) months aftei the bii tl 11 : i Sidi ie>
Laken Fluhman.
"i
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17. No notice was sent to the petitioner or any contact made by either Laura Fluhman or
Paige Parsons informing him of Paige Persons' intent to adopt Sidney Laken Fluhman.
18. In February 1998, the petition seeking the adoption by Patricia Paige Parsons of Sidney
Laken Fluhman was granted by the Second District Court, Davis County, state of Utah and a Decree
of Adoption was entered in case no. 982700016. Sidney Laken Fluhman was approximately eleven
(11) months old at the time this Decree had been entered.
19. After the adoption had occurred the petitioner was informed by the respondents that the
basis for the adoption was to allow Sidney Laken Fluhman to be placed on the insurance of Patricia
Paige Parsons.
20. The petitioner at all times has had medical insurance available through his employment
and offered that insurance to Laura Fluhman and she refused it.
21. The petitioner did notfilean acknowledgment of paternity in this matter.
22. The petitioner had in fact developed and established a relationship with the minor child
prior to being prohibited from continuing with that relationship by the respondents.
23. The respondent, Laura Fluhman, has health problems and it was her intent and desire that
should something happen to her as a result of her health problems that the child not be raised by the
petitioner but only be allowed to be raised by her mother Patricia Paige Parsons.
24. Since the birth of the child the child has continuously lived with the respondent Laura
Fluhman. Laura Fluhman takes care of the child each day including the preparation of the child's
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meals. clothir.*. * .

•

'.- v;

*~

!

The child resides with her in her room. There has

been no time period since its buM. w\wu use child has changed its living conditions or status. Prior
e
conditions for the child and respondents even now.
25.

The respondent, Paige Parsons, does financially assist I .aura Fluhman and Sidney

I liilnium Mitiiliiily ii'i, .n tj-iiiinlpaiiiiiil

• .

From the foregoing Findings of Fac: i]w , \ \ n ! makes these its

1. rheinuia J • i - :

• PatneiaPaig' Pa*. ::

i -\

ioption of the cl lild was filed

in the Third District Court, Salt I ,ake County in, civil no. 972900190AI > was improper and the court
1:1 lei 3in \\ as v\ itl 101 it ji in: isdictioi I to act.

• . •

2. The only court w hich w ould hav e had jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the petition
would have been the Second District Court, Davis County, state of I Jtah
3 Pi n si in Li .1 t I Jtall! i, Cc : 1< \ t i i § 78 30 7
in the district where the person adopting resides vwncl* m r us particular case would \\w K.vr. n

.. *n this action the child was "placed for adoption ' when the child was at least six (6)
months old with the time being on approximately January/12,1998 when the adoption was transferred
1 : till: „ : • Second Di 1 i i : 1 , <. : w m I: i„i i c; i si : i n lit i il >< n 982 700016.

00006013.99

5

i

5. The petitioner had developed a substantial relationship with the child in view of the child's
age. The petitioner had visited with the child at least monthly. The petitioner had taken a measure
of responsibility to provide for the child including obtaining gifts, providing money to the natural
mother, support payments and monies given during the natural mother's pregnancy. The petitioner
had demonstrated a full commitment to the child and was willing to do even more than he had
previously given to the child. He spent time with the child under the restrictions and prohibitions as
put upon him by the respondents.
6. Because the respondent, Laura Fluhman, has continually lived with her mother, the child's
placement has never been such as to put the petitioner on notice as is contemplated pursuant to the
statute. "Placement" means having the person on notice that something has occurred. In this action
nothing has occurred that could be seen or deemed as placing the petitioner on notice that the child
was "placed for adoption".
7. The adoption in probate number 982700016AD on February 9, 1998 is not perfected as
to the petitioner.
DATED this ^-tvV day of $^-1999
BY THE COURT:

THOMAS L. KA
District Court Judge
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